iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies calculator

Once I realized that I decided to ignore the application entirely. \end{bmatrix}$. We can generalize this to say that rational players never play strictly dominated strategies. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies - example, Improving the copy in the close modal and post notices - 2023 edition, New blog post from our CEO Prashanth: Community is the future of AI, Reduce the payoff matrix using (weakly) dominated strategies. As in Chapter 3 we would like to clarify whether it aects the Nash equilibria, in this case equilibria in mixed strate-gies. and an additional point for being at their preferred entertainment. Some strategiesthat were not dominated beforemay be dominated in the smaller game. Proposition 1 Any game as at most one dominant solution. The reason it lists strictly dominated strategies instead of strictly dominant strategies is that there is no guarantee that a player will play a strictly dominant strategy in equilibrium once you extend past 22 matrices. /Filter /FlateDecode /BBox [0 0 8 8] It seems like this should be true, but I can't prove it myself properly. /Resources << strategies. It may be that after I factor in your strictly dominated strategy, one of my strategies becomes strictly dominated. Choose a player and remove all the strictly dominated strategies for that player. Ther is no pure Nash equilibrium if where the row player plays $M$, because column's best response is $U$, but to $U$ row's best response ins $B$. Note that the payoffs of players 1 and 2 do not depend on the strategy on player 3 and the payoff of player 3 depends only on the strategy of player 2. Stack Exchange network consists of 181 Q&A communities including Stack Overflow, the largest, most trusted online community for developers to learn, share their knowledge, and build their careers. =2m[?;b5\G By clicking Accept all cookies, you agree Stack Exchange can store cookies on your device and disclose information in accordance with our Cookie Policy. Share. This results in a new, smaller game. M & 1, 2 & 3, 1 & 2, 1 \\ \hline The answer is positive. 32 0 obj << 8 0 obj Cournot Duopoly - Elimination - GeoGebra PDF A Primer In Game Theory Solutions Pdf (2023) By clicking Accept all cookies, you agree Stack Exchange can store cookies on your device and disclose information in accordance with our Cookie Policy. Of the remaining strategies (see IESDS Figure 3), B is strictly dominated by A for Player 1. >> endobj This is called Strictly Dominant Mixed Strategies. It is the tech industrys definitive destination for sharing compelling, first-person accounts of problem-solving on the road to innovation. It turns out that in 2-player games, the two concepts . Games in which all players have dominant strategies are still strategic in the sense that payoff depends on what other players do, but best response does not. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies game theory - Are there strictly dominated strategies? - Economics The reason it lists strictly dominated strategies instead of strictly dominant strategies is that there is no guarantee that a player will play a strictly dominant strategy in equilibrium once you extend past 22 matrices. Both methods have in common one major shortcoming, they do not always narrow down what may happen in a game to a tractably small number of possibilities. We are now down to exactly one strategy profile both bars price their beers at $4. But I can not find any weakly dominated strategy for any player. Tourists will choose a bar randomly in any case. 6.3. ris strictly dominated byl Once ris deleted we can see that Bis iteratively strictly dominated byTbecause 5>4 and 7>5. The opposite, intransitivity, occurs in games where one strategy may be better or worse than another strategy for one player, depending on how the player's opponents may play. This follows from the earlier comment that a strictly dominated strategy is never a best response. order of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies may matter, as shown by Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002). However, there's another way we can use the concept of. 4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies. 1 Answer. On the other hand, if it involves a tied value, a strategy may be dominated but still be part of a Nash equilibrium. Of the remaining strategies (see IESDS Figure 2), Z is strictly dominated by Y and X for Player 2. There are two types of dominated strategies. 34 0 obj << >> endobj $$ Mean as, buddy! 5,1 & 1,5 & 1,2 \\ For Player 2, X is dominated by the mixed strategy X and Z. PDF Chapter 10 Elimination by Mixed Strategies - Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica Therefore, Player 1 will never play strategy C. Player 2 knows this. /ProcSet [ /PDF ] PDF Lecture 2: Dominated strategies and their elimination - UMass Is it safe to publish research papers in cooperation with Russian academics? B:R>)`Q. Solutions Practice Exam - Practice Exam Game Theory 1 - Studocu Iterative Deletion of Dominated Strategies - YouTube Game theory II: Dominant strategies - Policonomics If a player has a dominant strategy, expect them to use it. M & 1, 2 & 3, 1 & 2, 1 \\ \hline Game Theory Calculator | William Spaniel This results in a new, smaller game. PDF Iterated Strict Dominance - Simon Fraser University Q: (2) Consider the following two-player norma. I.e. ) eH\h GPqq rDn%,p;/K0 Jb{Cx3vmQ6JX4|qXhxL` bF$9 "5v'2WuGdBmq+]-m>ExV#3[2Z9'hxOpT, ^.\K|Z.+G%IOIB h "FtMUvr! z$"xh~w{e` , once Player 1 realizes he has a dominant strategy, he doesnt have to think about what Player 2 will do. This lesson formalizes that idea, showing how to use strict dominance to simplify games. On the order of eliminating dominated strategies - ResearchGate 2 0 obj << Im sure that the people who have gone out their way to tell you how much they appreciate your work are only a fraction of the people out there who have used it, but its the least I can do! PDF Dominant and Dominated Strategies - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign % Unable to execute JavaScript. uF~Ja9M|5_SS%Wc@6jWwm`?wsoz{/B0a=shYt\x)PkSu|1lgj"3EO1xT$ To subscribe to this RSS feed, copy and paste this URL into your RSS reader. : Whereas looking for an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies involves finding a strategy that is always the best response for each player, looking for an equilibrium via iterated deletion involves iteratively discounting from consideration strategies that are never best responses. Could a subterranean river or aquifer generate enough continuous momentum to power a waterwheel for the purpose of producing electricity? player 1's strategy space, leaving the game looking like below. Question: (d) (7 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Problem set 2 - (explained) - Problem Set #2: Topic 2 - Studocu , For the row player R the domination between strategies can be seen by comparing the rows of the matrices P R. When player 2 plays left, then the payoff for player 1 playing the mixed strategy of up and down is 1, when player 2 plays right, the payoff for player 1 playing the mixed strategy is 0.5. However, remember that iterated elimination of weakly (not strict) dominant strategies can rule out some NE. Were told that each bar only cares about maximizing revenue (number of beers sold multiplied by price.) density matrix, English version of Russian proverb "The hedgehogs got pricked, cried, but continued to eat the cactus". The construction of the reduced strategy form matrix. x[?lR3RLH TC+enVXj\L=Kbezu;HY\UdBTi /BBox [0 0 5669.291 8] When a player tries to choose the "best" strategy among a multitude of options, that player may compare two strategies A and B to see which one is better. Example of an iterated deletion of dominated strategy equilibrium. $u_1(U,x) = 1$, $u_1(M,x) = 1$, $u_1(B,x) = 1+4a$. Consider the following game to better understand the concept of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. endstream A dominated strategy in game theory occurs when one player has a more dominant strategy over another player. Game Theory - Mixed strategy Nash equilibria, Game Theory 2x2 Static Game: Finding the Pure Strategy and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria with Weakly Dominant Strategies, The hyperbolic space is a conformally compact Einstein manifold, Checks and balances in a 3 branch market economy, Counting and finding real solutions of an equation. A reduced matrix will still give us all the necessary information we need to solve a game. And is there a proof somewhere? Pricing at $5 would be. This is the premise that allows a player to make a value judgment on the actions of another player, backed by the assumption of rationality, into a weakly dominant strategy is a strategy that provides at least the same utility for all the other player's strategies, and strictly greater for some strategy. 11 0 obj For player 2, however, right is Your table seems to be correct. The process stops when no dominated strategy is found for any player. If, after completing this process, there is only one strategy for each player remaining, that strategy set is the unique Nash equilibrium. N&]'Odmi"9KVka@k\kl5lo9v~kx&N]jxZQYQ 3Jn+wnOkS`dj e,' {CIWx53_l`WPU NT]u` v!t Each bar has 60 potential customers, of which 20 are locals and 40 are tourists. In this sense, rationalizability is (weakly) more restrictive than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. and 40 are tourists. T & 2, 1 & 1, 1 & 0, 0 \\ \hline The second version involves eliminating both strictly and weakly dominated strategies. knows that player 1 knows that player 2 is rational ( so that player 2 /BBox [0 0 27 35] Assuming you cannot reduce the game through iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, you are basically looking at taking all possible combinations of mixed strategies for each player and seeing if an opposing strategy can fulfill the Nash conditions. Improving the copy in the close modal and post notices - 2023 edition, New blog post from our CEO Prashanth: Community is the future of AI. cZiAIF}$\ScQME xXKs6WH0[v3=X'VmRL+wHc5&%HnEiP$4'V( 'kT.j!J4WpK'ON_oUC]LD[/RJ%X.wJGy4Oe=x\9G"cQKOx5Ni~7dUMZ\K#?y;U sR8S:ix@4AA x}V[7SHQu'X6Yjuf`a5IG*YR|QRJz?uhn~~}?Ds&>y: tation in few rounds of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated strategies. Two bars, Bar A and Bar B, are located near each other in the city center. Yes. % %PDF-1.5 If, at the end of the process, there is a single strategy for each player, this strategy set is also a Nash equilibrium. Okay, thanks, now I understand. The strategy $2 always gives lower payoffs to Bar A than either $4 or $5. Lets see why the strategy is strictly dominated by the strategy $4 for Bar A: Therefore, Bar A would never play the strategy $2. Example of an iterated deletion of dominated strategy equilibrium. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies - example In this scenario, the blue coloring represents the dominating numbers in the particular strategy. I plugged in the exact same prisoners dilemma you illustrated in your youtube video. Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies More generally: We can safely remove any strategy that is strictly dominated It will never be selected as a solution for the game Iteratively removing dominated strategies is the first step in simplifying the game toward a solution Is it sufficient? A: As we answer only 3 subparts . It is just the tradeoff if you want to use it. Therefore, Player 2 will never play Y. In the figure above, down is strictly dominated by up for player 1 , and so EC202, University of Warwick, Term 2 13 of 34 This process is valid since it is assumed that rationality among players is common knowledge, that is, each player knows that the rest of the players are rational, and each player knows that the rest of the players know that he knows that the rest of the players are rational, and so on ad infinitum (see Aumann, 1976). island escape cruise ship scrapped; Income Tax. endobj To solve the games, the method of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies has been used. This gives Bar A a total of 40 beers sold at the price of $2 each, or $80 in revenue. PDF CS 331: Artificial Intelligence Game Theory I - Oregon State University Locals will buy from the bar setting the lowest price (and will choose randomly if the two bars set the same price). 24 0 obj (Iterated Delation of Dominated Strategies) Strategic dominance - Wikipedia !mH;'{v(opBaiCX7J9YJ8RxO#C?_3a3b{:mN'7;{5d9FX}-R7Ok:d=6C(~dT*E3En5S)1FgMvhTU}1"6.Kn'9m#* _QfxF[LEN eiDERbJYk+ n?x>3FqT`yUM#:h-I#5 ixhL(5t5+ou\SH-kRmj0 !pTX$1| @v (S5>^"D_%Pym{`;UM35t%hPJVixb[yi ucnh9wHwp3o?fB%:v"B@F~Ch^J87X@,za$pcNJ PDF Distributed iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies - arXiv Consider the following game to better understand the concept of iterated Consequently, if player 2 knows that player 1 is rational, and player 2 In this game, as depicted in the adjacent game matrix, Kenney has no dominant strategy (the sum of the payoffs of the first strategy equals the sum of the second strategy), but the Japanese do have a weakly dominating strategy, which is to go . How do I stop the Flickering on Mode 13h? Can my creature spell be countered if I cast a split second spell after it? PDF Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance - Duke University Bar A knows that it will not play $2, and neither will its opponent. Iterated elimination is about removing strategies which are dominated by other ones. Its just math, you dont have a copyright privilege to pure mathematics. The calculator works properly, at least in the case you brought to my attention. 1991 george w bush double eagle coin value Mathematics Stack Exchange is a question and answer site for people studying math at any level and professionals in related fields. Column 2kare strictly dominated by Row k+1 and Column k+1, respectively. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE)? Wouldn't player $2$ be better off by switching to $C$ or $L$? Built In is the online community for startups and tech companies. The hyperbolic space is a conformally compact Einstein manifold. /Font << /F45 4 0 R /F50 5 0 R /F46 6 0 R /F73 7 0 R /F15 8 0 R /F27 9 0 R /F28 10 0 R /F74 11 0 R /F76 12 0 R /F25 13 0 R /F32 14 0 R /F62 15 0 R /F26 16 0 R >> The newest edition also calculates the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain cooperation in a grim trigger strategy equilibrium of an infinite prisoners dilemma. Player 1 knows he can just play his dominant strategy and be better off than playing anything else. How to Identify a Dominated Strategy in Game Theory, There are two versions of this process. Now let us put ourselves in the shoes of Bar A again. (d) (7 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria - Chegg In the. A complete contingent plan is a full specification of a player's behavior, describing each action a player would take at every possible decision point. You explain the fundamentals of game theory so explicitly in an easy-to-follow manner. For player 1, neither up nor down is strictly are correlated, then a player's strategy is rationalizable if and only if it survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For instance, consider the payoff matrix pictured at the right. 2For instance, in some extensive games, backward induction may be an elimination order of condition-ally dominated strategies that is not maximal, as will be shown in Example 2. xP( S1= {up,down} and S2= {left,middle,right}. Proof. I only found this as a statement in a series of slides, but without proof. (Note that we cannot say that L is a strictly dominant strategy for Player 2it does not dominate Cbut we can say that R is a strictly dominated strategy for Player 2: an optimizing Player 2 would never play R.) The second idea in the transition from dominant strategies to iterated dom- By the well known path independence of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies [1, 19, 41], fully reducing and results in the same game. endobj /Matrix [1 0 0 1 0 0] endobj I am jumping back into this after almost 20 years,,, with John Maynard Smiths Evolution and the Theory of Games. What were the poems other than those by Donne in the Melford Hall manuscript? The applet calculates . First note that strategy H is strictly dominated by strategy G (or strategy E), so we can eliminate it from consideration. 48 0 obj << This process is valid since its assumed that rationality among players is common knowledge. /R10 53 0 R \end{array} A player has a dominant strategy if that strategy gives them a higher payoff than anything else they could do, no matter what the other players are doing. No guarantees that it functions properly. In the first step, at most one dominated strategy is removed from the strategy space of each of the players since no rational player would ever play these strategies. : When iterated deletion of dominated strategies results in just one strategy profile, the game is said to be dominance solvable. PDF Chapter 3 Strict Dominance - Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica ]Gx+FxJs Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies with Unknown Parameters. Many simple games can be solved using dominance. S1={up,down} and If Bar B is expected to play $4, Bar A can get $80 by playing $2 also and can get $120 by playing $4. Proof It is impossible for a to dominate a 1 and a 1 to dominate a. PDF MATH 4321 Tutorial 5 Solutions /R12 52 0 R The process stops when no dominated strategy is found for any player. se7 gnx(\D4nLfZ[z\nS* l:ZM~_4w>nqtBOO]TS4H1K{!!j$Bu64@D4QsE?-a 4"/,>Y@ix7.hZ4_a~G,|$h0Z*:j"9q wIvrmf C a]= Consider the following game to better understand the concept of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies Bob: testify Bob: refuse Alice: testify A = -5, B = -5 A = 0, B = -10 Simplifies to: Bob: testify Alice: testify A = -5, B = -5 This is the game-theoretic solution to Prisoner's Dilemma (note that it's worse off than if both players refuse) 24 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium It uniquely survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, so the unique Nash equilibrium for this case is (Row k+1, Column k+1). Site design / logo 2023 Stack Exchange Inc; user contributions licensed under CC BY-SA. Thanks for creating and sharing this! /Contents 3 0 R . Your lessons will single handedly help me pass my public policy class! (b) (5 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. /PTEX.FileName (D:/Dropbox/Illinois/5\040-\0402015\040Summer/Game\040Theory/Slides/3_Dominant\040and\040Dominated/imark_bold-eps-converted-to.pdf) michelle meneses wife of vergel 19 0 obj Browse other questions tagged, Start here for a quick overview of the site, Detailed answers to any questions you might have, Discuss the workings and policies of this site. player 2 is rational then player 1 can play the game as if it was the game Ive used a lot of terminology, so lets look at an example to clarify these concepts. And I would appreciate it if you didnt password protect it. 17 0 obj << PDF 6.891 Games, Decision, and Computation February 5, 2015 Lecture 2 1 Games iuO58QG*ff/Uajfk@bogxeXNA 3eE`kT,~u`y)2*Amsgqm#0Py7N7ithA7@z|O:G#`IFR1Zwzdz: y[ i+8u#rk3)F@E[3r(xz)R2O{rhM! It involves iteratively removing dominated strategies. Player 2 knows this. ^qT4ANidhu z d3bH39y/0$ D-JK^^:WJuy+,QzU.9@y=]A\4002lt{ b0p`lK0zwuU\,(X& {I 5 xD]GdWvM"tc3ah0Z,e4g[g]\|$B&&>08HJ.8vdN.~YJnu>/}Zs6#\BOs29stNg)Cn_0ZI'9?fbZ_m4tP)v%O`1l,>1(vM&G>F 5RbqOrIrcI5&-41*Olj\#u6MZo|l^,"qHvS-v*[Ax!R*U0 For symmetric games, m = n. Enter payoff matrix B for player 2 (not required for zerosum or symmetric games). Are all strategies that survive IESDS part of Nash equilibria? This page was last edited on 30 March 2023, at 12:02. $\begin{bmatrix} << /S /GoTo /D [29 0 R /Fit] >> % Proposition 2 If (a ;b ) is a weakly dominant solution, then (a ;b . 1,1 & 1,5 & 5,2 \\ rev2023.4.21.43403. I know that Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS) never eliminates a strategy which is part of a Nash equilibrium. Expected average payoff of Strategy Z: (0+5+5) = 5 Want to practice what Im learning, and as far as I can find your calculator seems to be the only easiest best option available. endobj We obtain a new game G 1. Why do men's bikes have high bars where you can hit your testicles while women's bikes have the bar much lower? $$ Since these strategies . There are two versions of this process. If column mixes over $(L, M)$ - $x = (a, 1-a, 0)$ Problem 4 (30 points). Iterated elimination by mixed strategy. /Resources 49 0 R >> ngWGNo >> /Type /XObject Therefore, Player 1 will never play strategy O. Even among games that do have some dominated strategies, the remaining set of rationalizable strategies may be very large. So, is there any way to approach this? If total energies differ across different software, how do I decide which software to use? $u_1(U,x) = 5-4a$, $u_1(M,x) = 1$, $u_1(B,x) = 1$. IESDS on game with no strictly dominated strategies. M 5,1 6,3 1,4 0,0 2;1 1, 1 R Player 1/Player 2 2,2 3,3. However, If any player believes that the other player is choosing 19, then every strategy (both pure and mixed) is a best response. The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games Exercise 1. If all players have a dominant strategy, then it is natural for them to choose the . Fortunately, there is a solution concept that does guarantee to return a tractably small set of expected outcomes known as the Nash equilibrium. Elimination of Dominant Stategies The iterated elimination (or deletion) of dominated strategies (also denominated as IESDS or IDSDS) is one common technique for solving games that . /Length 3114 strategy is strictly dominated (check that each strategy is a best response to some strategy of the other player), and hence all strategies are rationalizable. If a player has a dominant strategy, expect them to use it. If Player 2 chooses U, then the final equilibrium is (N,U). Iterated strict dominance. The game is symmetric so the same reasoning holds for Bar B. Proof It is impossible for a to weakly dominate a 1 and a 1 to weakly dominate a. PDF Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions S2={left,middle,right}. It is possible that an action is not strictly dominated by any pure strategy, but strictly dominated by a mixed strategy. We cannot delete anything else. So, thank you so much! I developed it to give people who watch my YouTube course or read my game theory textbook the chance to practice on their own and check their solutions. 27 0 obj Why did DOS-based Windows require HIMEM.SYS to boot? Player 1 knows this. endobj 33 0 obj << This solver uses the excellent lrs - David Avis's . Mixed strategy X and Z will dominate pure strategy X for Player 2, and thus X can be eliminated from the rationalizable strategies for P2. How do I solve large game matrices? : r/GAMETHEORY - Reddit Learn more about Stack Overflow the company, and our products. For example, a game has an equilibrium in dominant strategies only if all players have a dominant strategy. D AB - Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. Some authors allow for elimination of strategies dominated by a mixed strategy in this way. The logic of equilibrium in dominant strategies is that if a player has a strategy that is always best, we would expect him to play it. dominated. The spreadsheet works very well and congratulations.I really do not know why the guy Cogito is claimming about. This process continues until no more strategies can be deleted. Observe the following payoff matrix: $\begin{bmatrix} \end{array} Browse other questions tagged, Start here for a quick overview of the site, Detailed answers to any questions you might have, Discuss the workings and policies of this site. And I highly doubt there is anything particularly unique or creative about your coding. PDF Rationalizable Strategies - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 16 0 obj E.g., cash reward, minimization of exertion or discomfort, promoting justice, or amassing overall utility - the assumption of rationality states that Can I use my Coinbase address to receive bitcoin? Your excel spreadsheet doesnt work properly. Strict Dominance Deletion Step-by-Step Example: Another version involves eliminating both strictly and weakly dominated strategies. Only one rationalizable strategy is left {A,X} which results in a payoff of (10,4). Exercise 2. We can generalize this to say that, Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies Example. Thinking about this for a moment, a follow up question emerges. I have attached a 2003 version to the original post, but not guarantees it functions properly. In that case, pricing at $4 is no longer Bar As best response. (up,middle) as the outcome of the game. Why is it shorter than a normal address? There are two versions of this process. Q: Address the following with suitable examples. This is a great example, and presented in a really nice way! stream COURNOT DUOPOLY - a static game A dynamic model Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies has been illustrated. Proof The strategy a dominates every other strategy in A. << /S /GoTo /D (Outline0.3) >> Existence and uniqueness of maximal reductions under iterated strict (h, h) is the unique profile that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. uX + uZ uX As a result, the Nash equilibrium found by eliminating weakly dominated strategies may not be the only Nash equilibrium. Locals will buy from the bar setting the lowest price (and will choose randomly if the two bars set the same price). Was Aristarchus the first to propose heliocentrism? /Shading << /Sh << /ShadingType 3 /ColorSpace /DeviceRGB /Domain [0 1] /Coords [4.00005 4.00005 0.0 4.00005 4.00005 4.00005] /Function << /FunctionType 2 /Domain [0 1] /C0 [0.5 0.5 0.5] /C1 [1 1 1] /N 1 >> /Extend [true false] >> >> But how is $(B, L)$ a NE? Works perfectly on LibreOffice. Do Nonproliferation AgreementsConstrain? i-gq;E6LMsZYRw=?O;yX9{^54aL%*,u{xpt6>P[bh1KiR3A+{2Bpw\m~UL52Z`XwQ@ EkBxEW._661ROEK-\,Q) .^^_z h6:10a&_M ; d82a06/qJb[0JP"HQ@ipJGs+n^!V*?z!_^CKyi=0#8x;T: 5/' oS94W0'|>4d~o4Kp5YhJ %0^ bT5! /Filter /FlateDecode Sorry I wrote the answer on my phone. The expected payoff for playing strategy X + Z must be greater than the expected payoff for playing pure strategy X, assigning and as tester values. (d) Are there strictly dominant strategies? PDF Itereated Deletion and Nash Equilibria - University of Illinois Chicago So far, weve concluded that Bar A will never play $2, but this is a game of complete information.
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